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THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE: 
INTRINSIC OR EXTRINSIC FRAUD 
RALPH ANZIVINO 
The economic loss doctrine provides that when a product is sold and 
results in economic loss for the buyer (no property or personal injury), 
the buyer’s sole remedy is to sue for breach of contract, not in tort.  The 
two exceptions to the economic loss doctrine are contracts that are 
predominately for services and contracts where a party is fraudulently 
induced to enter into the contract. 
 
Fraudulent inducement occurs when one party either fails to disclose a 
material fact or knowingly misrepresents a significant fact, and thereby 
induces the other party to enter into a contract.  The fraudulent 
inducement, however, may only be asserted as a claim against the 
fraudulent perpetrator if the court determines that the fraud is extraneous 
fraud and not intrinsic fraud.  In other words, the fraud claim cannot be 
raised against the tortfeasor in subsequent litigation if the fraud is 
determined to be intrinsic fraud. 
 
This Article serves two purposes.  First, the Article explains the 
difference between intrinsic fraud and extraneous fraud as required by the 
economic loss doctrine.  Second, the Article offers two recommendations 
that attorneys must adopt to protect their client from intrinsic fraud if the 
client is fraudulently induced to enter into a contract.  Otherwise, the other 
party’s fraudulent conduct will go unpunished. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The economic loss doctrine bars a contracting party from pursuing 
tort recovery for solely economic losses associated with a contractual 
relationship.1  In Wisconsin, the doctrine has been so widely applied that 
it applies to virtually every type of contract with only two exceptions.2  
One exception is a contract that predominantly involves services, and 
the other is one that involves a narrow type of fraud in the inducement, 
which is the subject of this Article.3  Only in those two limited 
circumstances can a fraudulent inducement case proceed in court.4 
Fraudulent inducement involves one party committing fraud either 
by an affirmative misrepresentation or by failing to disclose a material 
fact, thereby inducing the other party to enter into a contract under false 
pretenses.5  Under the narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the 
economic loss doctrine, a court must determine whether the fraud 
committed by the offending party is intrinsic fraud or extraneous fraud.6  
Only fraud that is considered extraneous to the contract can proceed as 
a tort claim.7  If the court determines that the fraud is intrinsic fraud, the 
tort claim will be dismissed, and only a breach of contract action, if 
available, can thereafter proceed.8 
The purpose of this Article is twofold.  First, the Article will 
illustrate and explain how to distinguish intrinsic fraud from extraneous 
fraud.  Intrinsic fraud is fraud that relates to the quality or 
characteristics of the product or, otherwise, involves performance under 
the parties’ contract.9  As one might expect, most fraud committed in 
 
1.  Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 27, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 
205.  
2.  Id. ¶ 42; Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 
688 N.W. 2d 462. 
3.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42; Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52. 
4.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42; Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52. 
5.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 33. 
6.  Id. ¶ 42. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. ¶ 35. 
9.  Id. ¶ 33. 
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conjunction with a contract involves intrinsic fraud with the result that 
the tort claim is barred.10  As a result, the only remedy left is a breach of 
contract action.11  Unfortunately, many attorneys do not anticipate the 
intrinsic fraud finding by a court and have not drafted the contract to 
properly protect their client.12  The second purpose of this Article is to 
recommend to counsel how to protect their client in the event intrinsic 
fraud is committed and their only possible remaining remedy is a breach 
of contract claim. 
II. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
The basic precept of the economic loss doctrine is that contract law 
and, more particularly, the law of warranty is better suited than tort law 
for addressing wrongs that involve only economic loss.13  There are three 
policies underlying the economic loss doctrine.14  They are (1) to 
maintain the basic distinction between tort and contract law so that each 
is applied in its own realm; (2) to protect the parties’ freedom to allocate 
the risks inherent in a transaction; and (3) to encourage the party best 
situated to assess the risk in the transaction, and the buyer to be able to 
assume, allocate, or insure against the risk.15 
In 1989, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the economic loss 
doctrine in the case of Sunnyslope Grading Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & 
Risberg, Inc.16  In Sunnyslope, the court held that a commercial 
purchaser of a product cannot pursue solely economic losses under 
negligence or strict liability theories from a manufacturer.17  
The first element that must be satisfied in applying the economic loss 
doctrine is that the transaction must involve a product.18  Originally, the 
product was understood to be a good that was subject to the protections 
of the Uniform Commercial Code.19  Today, however, the definition of 
the product has been so broadly interpreted by the courts to cover 
 
10.  See id. ¶ 33.  
11.  Ralph C. Anzivino, The Fraud in the Inducement Exception to the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 921, 941 (2007). 
12.  See Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
13.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 28. 
14.  Id.  
15.  Id. 
16.  148 Wis. 2d 910, 921, 437 N.W.2d 213, 217–18 (1989). 
17.  Id. 
18.  See Rodman Indus., Inc. v. G & S Mill, Inc., 145 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 1998). 
19.  Sunnyslope, 148 Wis. 2d at 920–21.  
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virtually every type of transaction, except for a contract that 
predominately involves services.20  For example, the economic loss 
doctrine has been held to apply to a component part of an integrated 
structure,21 the general contract for the construction of a home,22 the sale 
of raw land,23 a sump and drain tile system,24 the sale of telephone 
calling plans,25 a component of a manufactured product,26 the 
construction of a 42-unit condominium complex,27 a commercial real 
estate contract,28 and the grant of an option to purchase.29  When a 
contract involves both services and non-goods, the courts use the 
predominant purpose test to determine whether the economic loss 
doctrine will apply.30  In other words, the court has to determine 
whether the contract is predominately one for services or not. 
The second element that must be satisfied is whether the damages 
suffered are economic or involve personal injury or property damage.31  
A prior article addresses the distinction between economic and non-
economic damages.32  Sunnyslope made clear that the economic loss 
doctrine precluded a tort claim in negligence or strict liability when the 
damages suffered were solely economic loss.33  But what went 
unanswered for many years was whether the economic loss doctrine 
would apply to preclude a tort claim for fraud in the inducement when 
the damages suffered were solely economic loss. 
 
20.  Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 
N.W.2d 462. 
21.  Bay Breeze Condo. Ass’n v. Norco Windows, Inc., 2002 WI App 205, 257 Wis. 2d 
511, 651 N.W.2d 738. 
22.  Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189. 
23.  Mose v. Tedco Equities, 228 Wis. 2d 848, 598 N.W.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1999). 
24.  Komorowski v. Jeff Janssen Builders, Inc., 2006 WI App 244, 297 Wis. 2d 585, 724 
N.W.2d 703 (unpublished disposition). 
25.  Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652. 
26.  Wausau Tile, Inc. v. Cty. Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999). 
27.  1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Grp., Ltd., 2006 WI 94, 293 Wis. 2d 410, 716 N.W.2d 
822. 
28.  Van Lare v. Vogt, Inc., 2004 WI 110, 274 Wis. 2d 631, 683 N.W.2d 46. 
29.  Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen, 2007 WI 82, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 734 N.W.2d 855. 
30.  Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, ¶ 8, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189; 
Biese v. Parker Coatings, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 18, 24–25, 588 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Ct. App. 1998). 
31.  Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 33, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 
652. 
32.  See Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic 
Loss From Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081 (2008). 
33.  Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford and Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 921, 
437 N.W.2d 213, 217–18 (1989).  
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III. THE FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT EXCEPTION 
States have generally taken three approaches to whether the 
economic loss doctrine bars a claim for fraud in the inducement when 
the aggrieved party has suffered only economic loss.34  Some states do 
not recognize the exception and bar the fraud in the inducement claim 
the same as a negligence or strict liability claim;35 some states provide a 
general exception for all fraud in the inducement claims;36 and finally, 
some states recognize only a very narrow fraud in the inducement 
exception.37 
The policy reasons supporting the economic loss doctrine are said to 
be consistent with adopting the narrow fraud in the inducement 
exception.38  First, the narrow exception preserves the distinction 
between tort and contract law by requiring the parties’ contract to 
address matters that relate to the quality or character of the product and 
performance under the contract.39  Second, the narrow exception 
respects the parties’ freedom to contract by holding the parties to the 
terms of their contract.40  And finally, the narrow exception anticipates 
that the party best able to assess the risks inherent in the contract will 
address those risk and either assume, allocate, or insure against those 
risks.41 
Sixteen years after Sunnyslope, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
adopted the narrow exception to the economic loss doctrine for fraud in 
the inducement.42  It should be noted, however, that the Legislature 
rejected the narrow exception only for residential real estate sales and 
adopted the broad exception.43  The statute provides that a transferee in 
a residential real estate transaction may maintain an action in tort 
against a real estate transferor for fraud committed, or an intentional 
 
34.  Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 31, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 
205.  
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id.; see also HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 
1996); Wyle v. Lees, 33 A.3d 1187, 1191 (N.H. 2011); Huron Tool and Eng’g Co. v. Precision 
Consulting Servs, 532 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
38.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 46. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. ¶ 48. 
41.  Id. ¶ 50. 
42.  Id. ¶ 42; see also Anzivino, supra note 11, at 933. 
43.  WIS. STAT. § 895.10 (2013–2014). 
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misrepresentation made, by the transferor in the real estate 
transaction.44  
There are three primary components to the narrow fraud in the 
inducement exception and each must be established.45  The first 
component is that there must be an intentional misrepresentation.46  
There are five elements to intentional misrepresentation that must be 
proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence47 to establish an 
intentional misrepresentation.  First, the offending party must make a 
factual representation.48  The representation can be by writing, word of 
mouth, conduct, or even silence if there is a duty to speak.49  Second, the 
representation must be untrue.50  Third, the offending party must have 
made the representation knowing it to be untrue or made it recklessly 
without caring whether it was true or not.51  Fourth, the representation 
was made with the intent to deceive the other party and to induce the 
other party to rely upon it.52  And fifth, the injured party believed the 
offending party and relied upon the representation.53 
The second component of the fraud in the inducement exception 
requires that the aggrieved party prove that the intentional 
misrepresentation occurred before the contract was formed.54  And 
finally, the third component requires proof that “the fraud was 
extraneous to, rather than interwoven with, the contract.”55  In other 
words, fraud that is considered to be extraneous to the contract is not 
barred by the economic loss doctrine, but fraud that is considered to be 
interwoven with, or intrinsic to the contract, is barred by the economic 
loss doctrine.56  Thus, a complaint that alleges and proves extraneous 
fraud can proceed as a tort action; one that alleges only interwoven, or 
 
44.  WIS. STAT. § 895.10(2) (2013–2014). 
45.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Wis. JI—Civil 205 (2012); Wis. JI—Civil 2401 (2014). 
48.  Wis. JI—Civil 2401 (2014). 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id.   
54.  Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 
205. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. ¶ 34. 
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intrinsic fraud, will be dismissed; and only a breach of contract action, if 
any, can proceed.57 
Courts have attempted to sharpen the difference between intrinsic 
fraud and extraneous fraud by providing various explanatory 
statements.58  For example, a common explanation of the difference is 
the statement that extraneous fraud concerns matters whose risk and 
responsibility do not relate to the quality or the characteristics of the 
goods under contract or otherwise involve performance of the 
contract.59  Thus, it is apparent that the intrinsic/extraneous fraud 
determination is based on a court identifying the intentional 
misrepresentation and, then, determining whether the misrepresentation 
relates to (1) the quality of the product; (2) the characteristics of the 
product; or (3) otherwise involves performance under the contract.60  
These are three separate and distinct areas of inquiry that the court 
must consider when making the intrinsic/extraneous fraud 
determination.61 
Misrepresentations that relate to the quality of the product or its 
characteristics are further explained to be either “expressly dealt with in 
the contract’s terms” or if they are not dealt with explicitly in the 
contract terms, they go to the reasonable expectations of the parties 
regarding the risk that the product might not meet the buyer’s 
expectations.62  Stated more succinctly, if the misrepresentation relates 
to a matter expressly covered by the contract or was a foreseeable risk 
inherent to the contract, the fraud will be deemed to be intrinsic fraud.63 
IV. INTRINSIC FRAUD 
When one party has made an intentional misrepresentation that has 
induced the other party to enter into a contract, it must be determined 
whether the fraud is intrinsic to the contract or extraneous to it.64  That 
determination is made by identifying the intentional misrepresentation 
and, then, determining whether the misrepresentation relates to (1) the 
quality of the product, (2) the characteristics of the product, or (3) 
 
57.  Id. ¶¶ 34–49. 
58.  See Anzivino, supra note 11, at 935. 
59.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 45. 
60.  See Anzivino, supra note 11, at 935. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 43. 
63.  Id.  
64.  Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
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otherwise involves performance under the contract.65  If the intentional 
misrepresentation relates to any of the three criteria, the fraud will be 
considered to be intrinsic fraud.66  The result of an intrinsic fraud 
determination is that any fraud claim will be barred by the economic 
loss doctrine, and the aggrieved party can only proceed with a contract 
claim.67  The courts have decided a number of cases under each of the 
three criteria, and those cases are discussed below.68  In addition to 
discussing the cases in each section, an explanation is provided to assist 
in distinguishing each criterion from the other.69 
A. Intentional Misrepresentations that Relate to the Quality of the 
Product 
Any intentional misrepresentations that relate to the quality of the 
product are considered to be intrinsic fraud.70  A review of the cases 
indicates that this is a complaint about whether the product functioned 
the way it was represented to function.71  In other words, when the 
product fails to perform or operate as represented, the 
misrepresentation will be deemed to be one regarding the quality of the 
product.72 
For example in Barden v. Hurd Millwork Co.,73 buyers bought gas-
filled, insulated glass products that were represented to be free from 
defects for the life of the products.74  The buyers complained that the 
seller made intentional misrepresentations in its brochures and other 
sales material that falsely represented the insulation value of its 
products.75  The court concluded that the fraud was interwoven with the 
 
65.  Anzivino, supra note 11, at 935. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. at 933.  
68.  See discussion infra Sections IV.1, IV.2, IV.3. 
69.  See discussion infra Sections IV.1, IV.2, IV.3.  It should be further noted that a few 
of the cases could arguably fit into more than one category, but the essential point is that if 
they fit into any of the three categories, the fraud is intrinsic or interwoven. 
70.  Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 
205.  
71.  See discussion infra pp. 9–11. 
72.  See discussion infra pp. 9–11. 
73.  No. 06-C-46, 2006 WL 2560109 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 5, 2006).  
74.  Id. at *2.   
75.  Id.  
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contract because the fraud related to the quality of the goods that were 
the subject matter of the contract.76 
In Borchardt v. Gore,77 the buyer purchased a used bulldozer from 
the seller.78  At the time of sale, the seller advised the buyer that the 
seller had replaced various parts in the machine and had no problem 
operating it after installing the new parts.79  The seller’s statement was 
false, and after a few hours of operation, the bulldozer stopped 
working.80  The court dismissed the buyer’s fraud claim because the 
seller’s fraud was interwoven with the contract.81  The court indicated 
that the alleged fraud went to the quality of the product sold, 
specifically, the bulldozer’s functional ability.82 
In D & B Automotive Equipment, Inc. v. Snap-On, Inc.,83 a buyer 
purchased a system called “the Shark,” which was a frame-straightening 
system that would make accurate and consistent measurements when 
repairing a vehicle.84  Unfortunately, the system woefully failed to 
function as represented.85  The buyer’s complaint alleged that the seller 
defrauded the buyer by engaging in a scheme that intentionally 
misrepresented the capability of the system.86  The court concluded that 
the fraud perpetrated was intrinsic fraud because the entire basis of the 
fraud claims related to the false statements made about the Shark 
system.87 
In Neuser v. Carrier Corp.,88 a class action was brought by a number 
of buyers who had purchased new furnaces from the seller.89  Although 
the expected useful life of a furnace is twenty years, the heat exchangers 
in the furnaces prematurely failed.90  The buyers alleged that Carrier 
knew that the heat exchangers would prematurely fail and fraudulently 
 
76.  Id. at *4. 
77.  2011 WI App 114, 336 Wis. 2d 477, 801 N.W.2d 350 (unpublished disposition).  
78.  Id. ¶ 4. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. ¶ 5. 
81.  Id. ¶ 12. 
82.  Id.  
83.  No. 03-CV-141, 2006 WL 776749 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2006). 
84.  Id. at *1. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. at *2. 
87.  Id. at *5. 
88.  No. 06-C-645-5, 2007 WL 1470855 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2007). 
89.  Id. at *3.  
90.  Id. at *1.  
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withheld such information from the public.91  The court, however, 
concluded that the fraud claim could not go forward because the 
misrepresentation related to the quality of the goods.92 
Finally in U-Line Corp. v. Ranco North America, LP,93 U-Line 
purchased V16 valves from Ranco for use in U-Line’s refrigeration 
units.94  Subsequently, the valves failed, and U-Line asserted that Ranco 
made false statements regarding the compatibility of the V16 valve with 
U-Line’s refrigerant.95  In addition, U-Line argued that Ranco also 
committed fraud when it lied about whether other customers were 
experiencing problems with the valves.96  The court concluded that the 
fraud committed by Ranco was intrinsic fraud because the fraud related 
to the quality of the valves.97 
In each of these cases, the essence of the aggrieved party’s claim was 
that the product did not function or operate as it was represented to 
function.  The misrepresentations were deemed to be intrinsic, or 
interwoven, because these were product representations that could 
have, and should have, been dealt with in the contract by the aggrieved 
party. 
B. Intentional Misrepresentations About the Characteristics of the 
Product 
Any misrepresentations that relate to the characteristics of a product 
are also considered to be intrinsic fraud.98  These misrepresentations are 
not about whether the product functioned as represented, but rather, 
these representations are about whether the product received is the 
product that was represented.99  Stated differently, the 
misrepresentation is about whether the buyer received the product that 
was described in the contract and not about the performance of that 
product.  The essence of the buyer’s complaint is that the buyer received 
 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. at *7. 
93.  2006 WI App 78, 292 Wis. 2d 485, 713 N.W.2d 192 (unpublished disposition). 
94.  Id. ¶ 5.  
95.  Id. ¶¶ 15–16.  
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. ¶ 54.  
98.  See Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶ 48, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 
652.  
99.  See id. 
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a different product than what was represented in the contract 
negotiations.100 
For example in S&C Bank v. Wisconsin Community Bank,101  S&C 
Bank purchased a portfolio of loans in conjunction with the purchase of 
a branch of Wisconsin Community Bank.102  Three of the loans 
purchased were from a borrower who defaulted shortly after the 
transaction closed.103  At the time of the sale of the branch and its 
portfolio, the sellers represented that the borrowers on the loans 
personally guaranteed them.104  It was subsequently learned that the 
loans were not guaranteed.105  Thereafter, S&C sued and asserted a 
claim for intentional misrepresentation.106  The court concluded that the 
fraud committed was intrinsic fraud.107  In the court’s opinion, it was 
“difficult to imagine a misrepresentation more interwoven with the 
contract than this one.”108  In other words, the three loans were 
represented by the seller to be guaranteed loans, but the loans actually 
sold were not guaranteed loans.  The product actually received by the 
buyer was a different product than the one the seller represented it was 
selling. 
Also in Bob Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Van Gorden,109 a buyer 
purchased a large parcel of land on the Chippewa flowage with the 
intent of subdividing the large parcel and selling individual lots.110  The 
large parcel was connected to contiguous land by a narrow strip of land 
that during high water periods would become submerged.111  After the 
sale and as the buyer began to make a roadway over the sometimes 
submerged land, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) stopped 
the construction.112  The DNR indicated that the large parcel was 
actually an island and not a peninsula as the buyer had anticipated.113  In 
 
100.  See id. 
101.  2008 WI App 51, 309 Wis. 2d 233, 747 N.W.2d 527 (unpublished disposition).  
102.  Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
103.  Id. ¶ 2. 
104.  Id. ¶ 15. 
105.  Id. ¶ 17. 
106.  Id. ¶ 19. 
107.  Id. ¶ 27. 
108.  Id. 
109.  2010 WI App 1, 322 Wis. 2d 735, 778 N.W.2d 171 (unpublished disposition).  
110.  Id. ¶ 4. 
111.  Id. ¶ 3. 
112.  Id. ¶ 5. 
113.  Id. 
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the subsequent litigation, it was argued that the seller and the seller’s 
agent intentionally misrepresented the nature of the parcel offered for 
sale.114  The court concluded that the fraud, if any, was intrinsic because 
the alleged misrepresentation involved the physical characteristics of the 
property.115 
Similarly in Shaw v. American State Equipment Co.,116 a buyer 
bought a piece of used machinery that the seller represented had 7,000 
hours of prior use.117  It was subsequently learned that the machine had 
50,000 hours of use at the time of its sale.118  After the discovery of the 
actual hours on the machine, the buyer sued on an intentional 
misrepresentation claim seeking to rescind the sale and recover 
damages.119  The court found that the seller had made an intentional 
misrepresentation to the buyer.120  However, the court dismissed the 
buyer’s fraudulent inducement claim because the fraud committed by 
the seller was deemed to be intrinsic fraud.121 
Along these same lines in Voyager Village P.O.A., Inc. v. 
Letourneau,122 a buyer purchased a vacant lot in a development that was 
subject to a recorded declaration of covenants.123  Several years later, 
the buyer received a sales mailer indicating that the Home Owner’s 
Association (the Association) would permit current owners to own up 
to four lots, and the four lots could be combined to pay only one annual 
assessment rather than four assessments.124  After the buyer purchased 
three additional lots, the buyer received notice from the Association 
that he would be required to pay four separate assessments on each of 
his lots.125  The buyer refused to pay the assessments, and the 
Association sued.126  The buyer defended the Association’s claim by 
asserting a counterclaim based on intentional misrepresentation.127  The 
 
114.  Id. ¶ 7. 
115.  Id. ¶ 16. 
116.  2007 WI App 138, 302 Wis. 2d 263, 732 N.W.2d 864 (unpublished disposition).  
117.  Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. 
118.  Id. ¶ 5.  
119.  Id. ¶ 2. 
120.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. 
121.  Id. 
122.  2012 WI App 73, 342 Wis. 2d 250, 816 N.W.2d 351 (unpublished disposition).  
123.  Id.  2. 
124.  Id. ¶ 3. 
125.  Id. ¶ 6. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. ¶ 8. 
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court noted that even if the Association made an intentional 
misrepresentation, the fraud claim was barred by the economic loss 
doctrine.128  The court reasoned that the fraudulent statements were 
intertwined in the contract and, thus, intrinsic.129  The court specifically 
noted that the representation regarding the merger of the four lots into 
the single lot for assessment purposes clearly implicated the 
characteristics of the lots.130   
Finally in Roundy’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Nash-Finch Co.,131 
Roundy’s sold two distribution centers to Nash, and thereafter, Nash 
failed to pay some post-closing adjustments.132  Roundy’s sued, and Nash 
defended the claim by asserting that Roundy’s had misrepresented the 
value of the distribution centers.133  One issue before the court was 
whether the misrepresentations regarding the value of the distribution 
centers was intrinsic fraud or extraneous fraud.134  The court concluded 
that any misrepresentations regarding the value of the distribution 
centers that were the subject of the contract were clearly interwoven in 
the contract and, thereby, intrinsic.135  In other words, the distribution 
centers that were actually sold were different than what the seller’s 
representations portrayed them to be.136   
In each of these cases, the essence of the aggrieved party’s claim was 
that the product it received was different than the product it was sold.  
The misrepresentations were deemed to be interwoven or intrinsic 
because these were product characteristics that could have, and should 
have, been dealt with in the contract by the aggrieved party. 
C. Intentional Misrepresentations that “Otherwise” Involve Performance 
Under the Contract 
The third criterion to be considered in making the 
intrinsic/extraneous determination is whether the misrepresentation 
“otherwise” involves performance under the contract.137  “Otherwise” 
 
128.  Id. ¶ 10. 
129.  Id. ¶ 11. 
130.  Id. ¶ 10. 
131.  No. 08C0142, 2008 WL 5377907 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 23, 2008). 
132.  Id. at *1. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. at *2. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Kaloti Enters. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶ 42, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 
 
 192 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:179 
obviously means that the misrepresentation does not fall within the 
“quality” or “characteristic” categories,138 which have already been 
explained.139  These misrepresentations are not about the functioning or 
operating capabilities of a product, nor about the description of the 
product but, rather, are about other performance issues under the 
contract.140  There are two different types of circumstances that fall 
within this third criterion.141  A finding of either circumstance by the 
court results in a determination of intrinsic fraud.142  First, are those 
circumstances where the alleged fraudulent conduct is dealt with in the 
contract and are not issues of “quality” or “characteristics” about the 
product.143  Essentially, this criterion is the catchall for matters included 
in the contract but don’t fit into the first two criteria.144  The second part 
of the “otherwise” criterion includes those matters or risks that were not 
dealt with in the contract but should have been because the matter or 
risk was a foreseeable one.145  There are a number of cases that illustrate 
each circumstance.146  
There are three cases that illustrate intrinsic fraud that involve 
matters that are covered by the contract but are not issues of “quality” 
or “characteristics.”  In Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,147  Digicorp 
was an authorized dealer for Ameritech products, and requested 
approval to sell an Ameritech calling plan called “Value-Link” through 
a distributor that was not an Ameritech-authorized distributor.148  
Ameritech approved the request, and a contract was negotiated between 
the parties.  The letter identified the sales people of the non-Ameritech-
authorized distributor as “1099 employees.”149  The contract further 
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provided that in the event any calling plan contracts were determined to 
have forged signatures, Ameritech had the right to terminate the 
contract.150  At the time of negotiating the Ameritech-Digicorp contract, 
Ameritech was aware that one of the non-Ameritech-authorized 
distributor’s sales people had a history of forging customers’ names on 
calling plan contracts.151  Ameritech never disclosed that information to 
Digicorp.152  A few weeks after sales began, it was discovered that the 
sales person—who had a history of committing forgery—had forged 
nearly 250 customers’ signatures.153  Pursuant to the contract, Ameritech 
terminated Digicorp as an authorized distributor.154  Thereafter, 
Digicorp sued Ameritech for intentional misrepresentation because of 
its failure to disclose the history of the salesman that committed the 
forgeries.155  The court indicated that its task was to determine whether 
the fraud involved was extraneous to or interwoven into the contract.156  
The court noted that the misrepresentation did not involve the actual 
“Value-Link” service that was the primary subject matter of the contract 
but, rather, which party would bear the risk and responsibility for the 
1099 employees.157  Further, the court indicated that the contract 
between the parties did address the responsibility for the 1099 
employees.158  As a result, the court concluded that the fraudulent 
behavior by Ameritech was interwoven with the subject matter of the 
contract and intrinsic fraud.159  The court reasoned that Ameritech’s 
misrepresentation concerned a matter that related to the performance 
of the contract and, as such, was not extraneous to the contract 
dispute.160   
Similarly in Superl Sequoia Ltd. v. C.W. Carlson Co.,161 the parties 
entered into a joint venture enterprise, and they agreed that they would 
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share gross profits equally after both parties were reimbursed for their 
costs.162  Prior to the formation of the contract, representations were 
made regarding how each party would calculate its costs before sharing 
profits.163  Thereafter, plaintiff did not calculate its costs according to the 
pre-contractual representations, which became the basis of the 
defendant’s fraudulent inducement claim.164  The parties’ contract, 
however, did provide a definition on how costs were to be calculated 
under the joint venture.165  Because the contract did specifically address 
the alleged fraud in the inducement, the court concluded that the fraud 
was interwoven into the contract and, thus, intrinsic fraud.166   
Finally in 1st Rate Mortgage Corp. v. Vision Mortgage Services 
Corp.,167 a part owner of 1st Rate Mortgage’s (1st Rate) business 
negotiated a buyout of his interest with the other owners while 
indicating that he was leaving the mortgage business.168  Unbeknownst 
to the other owners of 1st Rate Mortgage, the departing owner was 
secretly forming his own mortgage business and began soliciting 1st 
Rate’s customers.169  1st Rate sued the departing owner and alleged 
fraud as one of its claims.170  The court concluded that when the fraud 
claim is based on the same conduct as the breach of contract claim, the 
economic loss doctrine bars the tort claim.171  Essentially, if the contract 
covers the conduct, the contractual remedy is the sole remedy and not 
tort law.172 
Furthermore, there are two cases that illustrate those matters or 
risks that were not dealt with in the contract but should have been 
because the matter or risk was a foreseeable one.  In Schreiber Foods, 
Inc. v. Lei Wang,173 an American seller and an agent for a Chinese entity 
negotiated the sale of 200 tons of whey powder.174  The seller 
subsequently shipped a different composition of whey to the buyer, and 
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the buyer refused to pay for the shipment.175  Thereafter, the seller sued 
the agent for fraudulent inducement on the grounds that the Chinese 
buyer never intended to buy the whey despite the agent’s 
representations to the contrary.176  The agent moved for summary 
judgment on the fraud claim on the basis that the claim was barred by 
the economic loss doctrine.177  The court indicated that the risk of 
nonpayment was so obvious a risk that it should have been dealt with in 
the contract.178  The court further indicated that extraneous frauds are 
those risks that one would not expect to deal with in the contract.179  
Thus, the risk of nonpayment should have been dealt with in the 
contract, and any fraud relating to payment would be considered 
intrinsic fraud. 
In Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,180 Taurus brought an 
action against DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz alleging patent 
infringement.181  In response, DaimlerChrysler pled a counterclaim for 
fraudulent inducement on the basis that in prior patent infringement 
litigation between DaimlerChrysler and entities related to plaintiff, a 
comprehensive settlement agreement was reached whereby all patent 
disputes between the parties were resolved.182  Unknown to 
DaimlerChrysler at the time of the negotiation of the prior settlement 
agreement, the ‘658 patent, which was the subject matter of this 
litigation, was transferred to a related entity that was not bound by the 
prior settlement agreement.183  Taurus moved to dismiss the fraudulent 
inducement claim as barred by the economic loss doctrine.184  The court 
agreed that the tort claim should be barred because the fraudulent 
inducement claim related to the scope of the settlement agreement.185  
As a result, the fraud was found to be interwoven with the contract.186  
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The court reasoned that DaimlerChrysler should have ensured greater 
protection from future lawsuits by bargaining for a broader definition of 
licensed technology in the settlement agreement.187  DaimlerChrysler’s 
failure to protect itself in the contract from a foreseeable risk caused the 
fraud to be categorized as intrinsic fraud.188 
As illustrated, there are two different types of circumstances that fall 
within this “otherwise” or third criterion.  First, are those circumstances 
where the alleged fraudulent conduct is dealt with in the contract and 
are not issues of “quality” or “characteristics” about the product.  
Second, are those circumstances where the contract fails to deal with 
foreseeable matters or risks that were not dealt with in the contract, but 
should have been because the matter or risk was a foreseeable one.  A 
finding of either circumstance by the court results in a determination of 
intrinsic fraud. 
V. EXTRANEOUS FRAUD 
In 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the 
intrinsic/extraneous fraud distinction for claimants asserting fraud in the 
inducement in the case of Kaloti Enterprises v. Kellogg Sales Co.189  In 
Kaloti, Kaloti was a wholesaler who purchased cookies from Kellogg to 
subsequently resell to retail grocery stores.190  Kellogg and Kaloti had a 
prior course of dealing with each other.191  At some point, Kellogg 
decided to change its marketing approach and intended to sell directly 
to the retail grocery stores rather than through wholesalers.192  
Thereafter, Kellogg solicited a large sale of cookies to Kaloti without 
disclosing that Kellogg had changed its marketing approach, which 
would essentially eliminate the ability of Kaloti to resell its cookies to 
the grocery stores.193  In fact, after Kaloti paid for the cookie order, 
Kaloti’s major customers advised Kaloti that they would no longer be 
buying cookies from Kaloti, but rather, they would be buying them 
directly from Kellogg.194  Because Kaloti was unable to resell the 
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cookies, Kaloti suffered a loss in the amount of $100,000.195  Kaloti sued 
to recover its loss on the theory that Kellogg’s failure to disclose the 
change in marketing strategy constituted fraud in the inducement to the 
cookie contract.196  Kellogg defended on the ground that Kellogg had no 
duty to disclose its change in marketing strategy to Kaloti, and in either 
event, the economic loss doctrine barred Kaloti’s misrepresentation tort 
claim.197  The court concluded Kellogg did have a duty to disclose its 
change in marketing strategy to Kaloti.198  As a result, Kellogg’s failure 
to disclose constituted a fraudulent inducement that induced Kaloti to 
enter into the cookie agreement.199  Nevertheless, Kellogg asserted that, 
because Kaloti’s damages were solely economic, the economic loss 
doctrine barred any tort claim, including fraud in the inducement, by 
Kaloti.200  The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed and adopted the 
narrow fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss 
doctrine.201  In other words, only fraud in the inducement claims that are 
extraneous to the parties’ contract are actionable in tort.202  The court 
defined extraneous fraud as fraud that “concerns matters whose risk and 
responsibility [do] not relate to the quality or the characteristics of the 
goods for which the parties contracted, or otherwise involves 
performance of the contract.”203  Essentially, the court’s definition was 
that extraneous fraud is simply not intrinsic fraud.204  However, the court 
provided a more useful indication of extraneous fraud when it stated 
that the relevant inquiry is to examine the relationship between the 
inducing representation and the essential requirements of the 
contract.205  Stated differently, if the inducing misrepresentation 
concerns matters or risks that are dealt with in the contract or should 
have been dealt with in the contract because the matter or risk was 
foreseeable, the misrepresentation is intrinsic fraud.206  On the other 
hand, if the inducing misrepresentation does not concern matters or 
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risks that are dealt with in the contract or matters or risk that were not 
foreseeable at the time of contracting, the misrepresentation is 
extraneous fraud.207  Applying the extraneous fraud standard to the case, 
the court concluded that the intentional misrepresentation committed 
by Kellogg was extraneous fraud.208  The court remarked that the 
inducing misrepresentation did not concern any performance under the 
contract, nor the quality or characteristics of the cookies sold.209  Rather, 
the court noted that the inducing misrepresentation related to a matter 
or risk that was never contemplated to be part of the contract.210  
Further, the court reasoned that the change in marketing strategy is not 
a matter that was dealt with in the contract, nor would one expect that 
to have been dealt with in the contract.211  To further amplify the 
difference between intrinsic fraud and extraneous fraud after Kaloti, 
another court quipped that had the Rice Krispy treats that Kellogg sold 
to Kaloti turned out to be strawberry rice bubbles (an Australian 
version of the Rice Krispy treat) that would have been intrinsic fraud.212  
After Kaloti, there are a few other cases that have found extraneous 
fraud.  In Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen,213 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
was again faced with the intrinsic/extraneous fraud determination.  In 
Wickenhauser, the Wickenhausers, who had a farming operation, 
borrowed money from Lehtinen on a number of occasions and gave 
Lehtinen a mortgage on their 300-acre parcel to secure their loans.214  
Thereafter, Lehtinen presented an option to purchase to the 
Wickenhausers, which gave Lehtinen the right to purchase the 300 acres 
for three years.215  Lehtinen told the Wickenhausers that he would not 
record the option and that the option was just a form of additional 
collateral to secure their loans.216  Thereafter, Lehtinen exercised the 
option and the Wickenhausers refused to sell.217  In the prior case 
between the same parties, the court ruled for the Wickenhausers and 
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rescinded the option.218  In this case, the Wickenhausers sought damages 
for the alleged fraud committed by Lehtinen in inducing them to grant 
the option to purchase.219  The court noted that the Wickenhausers’ 
claim was for an intentional misrepresentation that induced them to 
grant the option to Lehtinen.220  Further, the court reasoned that the 
fraud was extraneous because the inducing misrepresentations related to 
the option to purchase and did not relate to the loan contract, which was 
the primary contractual relationship between the parties.221  As a result, 
the tort case was permitted to go forward.222 
A less convincing case of extraneous fraud is Triad Group, Inc. v. Vi-
Jon, Inc.223  In Triad, Vi-Jon and Triad had an ongoing relationship 
whereby Vi-Jon provided raw materials to Triad, Triad would purchase 
additional raw materials, and then Triad would manufacture a final 
product for Vi-Jon.224  In 2011, the parties again entered into a 
continuing contractual relationship for the manufacture by Triad of the 
final product.225  Subsequently, the government seized a number of 
products at Triad’s production facility due to contamination.226  As a 
result of the seizure, Vi-Jon terminated its contract with Triad, and 
litigation ensued between the parties.227  During the litigation, Vi-Jon 
alleged that Triad committed fraud in the inducement because at the 
time of renewing their contractual relationship, Triad failed to disclose a 
pending FDA investigation to Vi-Jon.228  The court concluded that 
Triad’s fraud was extraneous because Vi-Jon’s complaint was not about 
the completed product, but rather, it was about Triad’s inability to 
perform on the contract.229  It is true that the complaint was not about 
the quality of the completed product or its characteristics.230  But, the 
third criterion for intrinsic fraud is about performance under the 
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contract, to which Triad’s fraud is directly related.231  In fact, the court 
acknowledged that Vi-Jon’s complaint was “closely related to Triad’s 
performance on the contract.”232  Although the court stated that the 
fraud in Triad was akin to the fraud in Kaloti, the cases are really not 
parallels.  The standard set by Kaloti is to examine the relationship 
between the inducing misrepresentation and the essential requirements 
of the contract.233  The inducing misrepresentation in Kaloti was the 
failure to disclose a change in marketing strategy that would affect 
Kaloti’s ability to resell the cookies to a third party.234  No one would 
have expected Kaloti to address in its contract, with Kellogg, any issues 
about Kaloti’s ability to sell its cookies to third parties.  On the other 
hand, in Triad the inducing misrepresentation was directly about Triad’s 
ability to perform on the contract between Triad and Vi-Jon.235  Vi-Jon 
should have protected itself with warranties regarding performance 
under the contract.  Performance issues would certainly be foreseeable 
ones that should have been addressed in the contract, and any fraud 
related to performance issues is intrinsic fraud.  It is certainly arguable 
whether Triad is truly a credible case of extraneous fraud. 
On the other hand, in Zimmerman v. Logemann,236 a court found 
both intrinsic fraud and extraneous fraud in the same transaction.  In 
Zimmerman, the Zimmermans alleged that their mortgage broker, 
appraiser, and lenders falsified plaintiffs’ financial information and 
knowingly inflated the appraisal of the property the Zimmermans 
wished to purchase in order to dupe them into accepting a home loan 
that they could not afford.237  The Zimmermans sued the defendants on 
a number of theories including fraud in the inducement.238  The 
Zimmermans identified the following misrepresentations as the basis of 
their fraudulent inducement claim:  
(1) defendants . . . promised plaintiffs that the monthly mortgage 
payment would be less than $ 1000; 
(2) defendants . . . inflated plaintiffs’ income on the application 
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form without their knowledge; 
(3) defendants . . . promised plaintiffs that refinancing would be 
available the following year; 
(4) defendants . . . knowingly appraised the property at higher 
than fair market value; 
(5) defendants represented to plaintiffs that they qualified for 
the mortgage; 
(6) defendants failed to disclose that one of the mortgages 
included a prepayment penalty; 
(7) defendants failed to disclose that one of the mortgages 
contained a balloon payment; 
(8) defendants failed to “check or confirm” plaintiffs’ income 
before approving the loan. 239 
The Kaloti test for distinguishing intrinsic from extraneous fraud is 
to examine the relationship between the inducing misrepresentation and 
the essential requirements of the contract.240  If there is a relationship, 
and the matter is or should have been covered by the contract, the fraud 
is intrinsic.241  In Zimmerman, the contract entered into by the 
Zimmermans was a mortgage contract.242  The court first noted that the 
misrepresentations about the mortgage payment being less than $1,000 
(#1), the failure to disclose the prepayment penalty (#6), and the failure 
to disclose the balloon payment (#7) were about the terms of the 
mortgage and, as such, were clearly intrinsic fraud.243  Further, the court 
observed that the defendants failure to “check or confirm” plaintiffs’ 
income before approving the loan (#8) was not a misrepresentation at 
all but a failure to act.244  Finally, the court concluded that items (#2)–
(#5) were extraneous fraud.245  Clearly, inflating the Zimmermans’ 
income on the application form (#2), artificially inflating the value of the 
appraisal (#4), and advising the Zimmermans that they qualified for the 
loan (#5) were not matters that were or would be expected to be in the 
loan contract, and as such, they were fairly determined to be extraneous 
fraud.  The misrepresentation regarding the promise that refinancing 
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would be available the following year (#3) is not a factual representation 
at all but, rather, a statement about the future and, as such, cannot be 
the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation.246  Nevertheless, the 
Zimmerman case is an excellent illustration of how a court distinguishes 
intrinsic fraud from extraneous fraud. 
VI. PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT FROM AN INTRINSIC FRAUD 
DETERMINATION 
A review of the preceding cases makes clear that a finding of 
intrinsic fraud is the most likely outcome when the issue before the 
court is whether the fraud is intrinsic or extraneous.  In fact, it is logical 
to expect that most fraud would be about the quality of the product, the 
product’s characteristics, or other bargained for performances expected 
under the contract.  The effect of such a finding is that the fraud claim is 
barred by the economic loss doctrine and the sole remedy remaining for 
the aggrieved party is to sue for breach of contract.247  Unfortunately, in 
many cases the aggrieved party’s attorney did not anticipate an intrinsic 
fraud finding by the court and did not lay the basis for a breach of 
contract action.248  As a result, the client is often left without a remedy 
against the perpetrator, and the only remaining remedy is to sue the 
offending attorney for malpractice. 
There are many cases that expose this failure to prepare the contract 
claim as a backup to the tort claim in the event the court determines that 
the alleged fraud is intrinsic fraud.  In Shaw v. American State 
Equipment Co.,249 the buyer purchased a piece of used machinery from 
the seller who represented that the machine had 7,000 hours of prior 
use.250  Upon learning that the machine had 50,000 hours of use,251 the 
buyer sued for intentional misrepresentation.252  The lower court 
awarded the buyer $60,000 in damages on the tort claim.253  On appeal, 
the court concluded that the intentional misrepresentation was intrinsic 
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fraud,254 reversed the lower court award, and dismissed the buyer’s 
complaint.255  The buyer’s complaint did not allege a backup claim for 
breach of contract.256   
In Gould v. Mitchell,257 Gould entered into an investment agreement 
based on representations that his monies would be used to pay 
attorney’s fees and develop prototypes; that the company had been in 
business for 10 years; and that the company had several new products at 
various stages of development.258  All these representations were false.259  
Upon discovery of the false representations, Gould sued in tort, alleging 
fraud.260  The court concluded that the fraud was intrinsic fraud and 
affirmed the dismissal of Gould’s tort action.261  Gould’s complaint did 
not allege a backup claim for breach of the investment contract.262   
In Creekwood Farms, Inc. v. Daybreak Foods, Inc.,263 the buyer and 
seller entered into a contract for the sale of the seller’s business.264  The 
contract anticipated that the buyer would need to secure financing to 
complete the sale.265  Prior to signing the contract, the buyer made 
representations that it would not be a problem for the buyer to secure 
financing.266  Based on that representation, the seller entered into the 
contract.267  At the time of the signing of the contract, however, the 
buyer failed to disclose that the buyer had to sell another property in 
order to get the financing.268  When the buyer failed to secure financing, 
the seller sued the buyer for fraud, breach of good faith, and breach of 
best efforts.269  The lower court dismissed the seller’s complaint.270  On 
appeal, the appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the fraud claim on 
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the basis that the alleged fraud was intrinsic fraud and barred by the 
economic loss doctrine.271  The court also found no merit in the breach 
of best efforts and good faith claims.272  Again, the contract was not 
drafted so as to anticipate an intrinsic fraud finding and preserve a 
breach of contract claim.273 
These cases and others like them indicate that the unmistakable tort 
claim can be fool’s gold in that the attorney’s primary focus is on the 
fraudulent misrepresentation, when it should have originally been on 
the contract.  A misrepresentation is not a breach of contract.274  Rather, 
to make a misrepresentation a breach of contract, the representation 
must be brought into the contract.275  This point is particularly 
compelling when one is dealing with intrinsic fraud.  A finding of 
intrinsic fraud means that the misrepresentation claim is dismissed 
pursuant to the economic loss doctrine, and if that representation has 
not been brought into the contract, there is also no breach of contract 
claim.276  For example in Shaw, if the contract contained the simple 
representation that the machine had 7,000 hours use, the case could 
have proceeded on a contract claim even though it was dismissed as a 
tort claim.  Also in Gould, had the various representations made by the 
seller been brought into the contract, the case would have proceeded as 
a breach of contract action despite the dismissal of the tort claim.  
Because of the likelihood that most misrepresentations will be found to 
be intrinsic fraud, it is essential that the attorney incorporate any and all 
representations made by the other party into the contract to provide a 
basis for a breach of contract action.  
The case of S&C Bank v. Wisconsin Community Bank,277 illustrates 
the wisdom of having a breach of contract action as a backup claim in 
the event the court dismisses the fraud claim as intrinsic fraud.  In S&C, 
S&C Bank purchased a bank branch from Wisconsin Community 
Bank.278  Also involved in the sale was Wisconsin Community Bank’s 
parent bank, Heartland Bank.279  During the sale, several loans that 
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were in Wisconsin Community’s portfolio were represented to be 
guaranteed loans, which turned out to be false.280  Upon default of those 
loans, S&C brought an action against Wisconsin Community for breach 
of contract and against Heartland for intentional misrepresentation.281  
At trial, the jury awarded $2.1 million against each defendant.282  Both 
appealed and on appeal, the court determined that the fraud committed 
by Heartland was intrinsic fraud.283  The result of the intrinsic fraud 
finding was that the intentional misrepresentation claim against 
Heartland was barred by the economic loss doctrine.284  Significantly, 
however, the $2.1 million judgment against Wisconsin Community that 
was based on the breach of contract theory was affirmed.285  This case 
illustrates the fact that an attorney can no longer rely upon a fraud 
theory to remedy a wrong committed against a client.  It is absolutely 
essential to include any and all representations into the contract because 
the fraud claim, in all likelihood, will be barred by the economic loss 
doctrine.  
Placing greater emphasis on including any and all representations 
into the contract only addresses part of the problem presented by an 
intrinsic fraud finding.  It has always been a foundational principle of 
contract drafting to include in the contract the representations and 
warranties relied upon in forming the contract.  Now, much greater 
importance is placed upon that principle because any fraud claim, unless 
it is extraneous fraud, will be dismissed.  But an even more problematic 
part of the intrinsic fraud issue is the situation where a party fails to 
disclose a material fact.  For example in the Creekwood case noted 
above, the buyer never disclosed to the seller that there were limits on 
the ability of the buyer to get financing, and the seller went forward with 
the contract without the knowledge of those limitations.286  Eventually, 
the buyer was unable to get financing because of the undisclosed 
limitations, and the seller sued the buyer for the fraud committed by 
concealing the limitations.287  The court concluded that the fraud was 
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intrinsic fraud and dismissed the tort claim.288  Absent a breach of 
contract claim as an alternative to the tort claim, Creekwood’s 
complaint was dismissed.289   
The way to address this problem is to turn a failure to disclose a 
material fact into a breach of contract.  An example of a clause that is 
neutral and would accomplish this task is as follows: Both parties 
understand that they each have a duty to disclose any and all material 
facts about this transaction to the other party, and each hereby 
represents that each party has disclosed any and all material facts about 
this transaction to the other party. 
The simple inclusion of the foregoing clause will cause a failure to 
disclose a material fact to become a breach of contract and avoid the 
trap of an intrinsic fraud determination.  In sum, an attorney can avoid 
the perils of an intrinsic fraud finding by simply following two simple 
recommendations.  First, it is imperative to include any and all 
representations made between the parties into the contract, which will 
thereby lay the basis, if needed, for a breach of contract action.  Second, 
it is just as important to include a clause, such as the foregoing, in every 
contract, which will thereby ensure that the other party’s failure to 
disclose material information will be a breach of contract.  Such an 
approach will insure that either an affirmative misrepresentation or a 
failure to disclose a material fact will support a breach of contract action 
and protect your client from an intrinsic fraud determination that 
dismisses the tort claim. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Far too often, one party fraudulently induces another to enter into a 
contract by either affirmatively misrepresenting or by failing to disclose 
a material fact.  Naturally, an attorney’s first instinct is to remedy the 
wrong through a fraudulent inducement claim.  Unfortunately, when the 
only damages suffered are economic, as opposed to personal injury or 
property damage, the economic loss doctrine will most likely be used to 
preclude the tort remedy.290  Wisconsin courts permit a fraudulent 
inducement claim to go forward only when the fraudulent conduct is 
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considered to be extraneous as opposed to intrinsic.291  Since intrinsic 
fraud concerns any fraud related to the quality or character of the 
product or other performance under the contract, most fraudulent 
inducements claims are intrinsic fraud.292   
The net effect of an intrinsic fraud determination is that the only 
remaining remedy is through a breach of contract action.293  In most 
cases, the parties contract will not have anticipated a fraud being 
perpetrated in the transaction and may not support a breach of contract 
action.294  With the advent of this intrinsic/extraneous fraud 
determination, it is essential that the attorney has prepared the contract 
with the possibility that intrinsic fraud may have been an inducement to 
the contract. 
There are two means available to an attorney to preserve a breach of 
contract action in the event intrinsic fraud has been committed.  First, 
the attorney must insert in the contract any and all representations that 
may have been a basis of the contract for the client.  Although that has 
always been a primary principle in contract drafting, it has become even 
more important with the advent of intrinsic fraud.  Second, it is also as 
important to insert a clause that will require each party to disclose any 
and all material facts about the transaction and to represent that they 
have done so.  By following these two simple recommendations, the 
attorney will have done everything possible to preserve a breach of 
contract action in the event of an intrinsic fraud determination by a 
court.  
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